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by LOUIS H. BURKE

"G

RANTED that the selection and appointment of judges on merit would be a
big improvement over electing them on a
partisan political basis, mistakes could still
be made! How would you get rid of such
a judge once you had cemented him In
off-ice for a long term or for life?
"Many judges now choose to remain in
office beyond a reasonable retirement age,
and even after their physical and mental
capacities have deteriorated. Others, with
too great security in office, have become
arbitrary, impatient and even incompetent.
If such judges are removed from the crucible of facing the electorate periodically,
what other means is there to keep them
humble, attentive and in touch with the
people? Through the use of the ballot box
the people retain in hand the means of

LOUIS Ii. BURICE, justice of the Supreme Court of
California and vice president of the American Judica.
ture Society, served as an original member of the
California Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

removal of such judges."
These queries and statements are often
heard in the wake of the nationwide movement to improve the methods of selection
and tenure of judges on a nonpartisan,
nonpolitical basis of merit, a movement of
grand proportions and accom plishmen t
headed by Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark of the
United States Supreme Court as Chairman
of the Joint Committee for the Effective
Administration of Justice. This committee,
hand in hand with the American J udicature Society, a fifty-year leader in the
national efforts to promote the efficient administration of justice, was immeasurably
aided by a generous public service gTant of ·
the Kellogg Foundation. The educational
program of the Joint Committee followed
in the footsteps of a National Conference on

· '>
IIiS

.l0I ·R"''''' OF Tlli': AI-li':RICi\N .l1 ' IlICATI I Ri': SOCII·:T\,

jlldicial Sl'kC li()lI ; 111(1 C()lIn Ad llliniSlr;l'lioI1 , held i'll Chicag() ill I !)!,q. which reCOlll lll elld ed thaL "a SyslClll pro vi dill g ;lppoinLl11 ellt or a jlldge 1'01' a definil e lel'lll 1'01 lowed b y e\cn iol1 1'01' a slicceed i ng l ern 1 ill
whi ch he l'llllS olll y ;lgainst his record, and
without compeLin g; ca lldidaLes, is 111I1Ch to
he prderrecl ovcr an elec Livc sysl.em in
which a judge lllust run against oppos ing
ca ndid a tes." T h is nati onal conrcrence was
i'ollowecl by the work or th e Joint COlllmi ttee whic h ham csscd in o ne operalion all
the resources of 17 nationa l organizations
co ncerned with judic ial administration.
Conrcrences, bot h slate and reg io nal, of
civic leaders, law yers and judges have bee n
held in al l parts ot the Unio n ror lhe purpose of study o[ th e ir respective state judic ial systems and co nstituti o nal provisions
with a view of m odernizin g m ethods for
the selection of judges, at the conclusion of
which con [erences a consens lls of conferees
has been pub lished, and by way of example
m ay I qu o te briefly from one of the more
r ecent of these conferences the co nse nsus ot
the "Citizens' Conference on Florida's Judicial System":
"J udges must be taken ou t of pol itics.
P o litica l e lection and one-man judicial
selection must be abo lished . A tested
method of securing the best judges to serve
the courts of Florida must be found.
"vVhenever a judicial vacancy occurs, a
slate of highly qualified nominees for that
office should be selected by an independent
nomin a tin g commission . The Governor
shou ld a ppo int one of these n omina ted candidates to fill the vacant office. The nonpartisan commission should be composed of
lay citizens and lawyers.
" Th ere should be a review of the appointed judge by the voters after a short
probationary term of judicial service and,
thereafter, a t the end of each term of that
judicial office. The judge should be required only to run agains t his record in
office on a noncompetitive ballot wh ere the
only question before the voter is whether
the judge's record justifies his continued
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n :lellLioll . . . . In addil.ion, jl ldi cial COlllpe llSa Lioll should be real iSl.ic;li I y e~labl isll Cd ,
afLer l.llOl'Oll gh st ud y, in order lo ;lll.racl: l.lte
l110st capab\c lll cn to tltc bell ch willt n :aSO ll ab\c aSSl lran ce or a co nl.inuin g ju dic ial
ca reer based o n perform ance."
CaLifornia Mo difi es PLa n

Cali forn ia was one of tlte first states o r
tlte U nion to ap p ly tlt e essentia ls o r SItCh
a systcm in 10:14; but, unrorlllnalcly, iL is
app licab le only to tlte appointment and
tenure or Supreme and Appellate Cou rt
judges. Such judges are appointed by the
governor a rter confirmation by a Commission on Judicial Appointments. At tlte next
ge ne ra l election tlte appointee's name goes
on tlt e ba ll ot and the voters vote on t.lte
proposition whetlter h e shall be reta in ed
in office. IE he receives a fa vorab le vote, he
then serves a term of twelve years before
Itis n ame again must go on the ballot. The
voters vote eitlter "yes" or "no" on Iti s r etention. If a majority vo te "no" the governor makes another appo intm ent subject,
again, to confirmat ion by the Comm iss ion
on Judicial Appoin tments. Th is periodic
facing of the electorate on the basis of the
judge's own record tend s to prevent a judge
from beco ming a rbitr ary, as somet im es
occurs ·where a judge is given li fe tenure
with no review of his record following his
appointment.
The California plan was a forer unn er to
a similar program endorsed by th e America n 13ar Association in 1937, but which program is applicable to trial court judges as
well as t o appellate jud ges. Missouri
adopted th e plan in 1940 and it became
popularly known througho ut the n ation as
the "M issouri Plan." R ecentl y Kansas, I owa,
Nebraska and Illinois adopted similar plans
in whole or in part. The constitution of
Alaska, adopted in D ecember, 1955, included a resolution which provided th at
judges run for election, unopposed, on
their r ecords.
Removing judges from politics and assuring them of tenure in office based upon per-
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f(il'mallCe req u ircs SOIIlC rC;lsoll;Ji)ic systcm
for the reLir c m e nt or rcmo va l or: StIch
judges when circ umstan ces warrant. such
action. These malle)"s arc interrelated and
should be a part of a unifi ed program. In
the Fl o rida co nferen ce, to which I have
alluded, the co nsensus sta les:
Florida Consensus

"F lorida ha s no r e i iablc mctilOd uJ: removin oj')" or ' relirin t')o' J'udo'es
who arc nnfit
n
because 01: miscondu ct or infirmil.y, wheLher
physica l or m c nl.al. A hir and ecollolllical
plan to discipl ille or remove SlIeil judges is
ne eded in Florida lOday.
"There should be ;1ll independent commissi o n, co mpmed of lay c iLizens, judges
and lawyers, c harged wil.h investigating
complaints against juclg'es o f any state court.
Every ciLize n should have the ri g ht to complain about any judic ial behavior to the
commiSSIOn.
"All complaints and commission proceedin gs should be confid entia l in order to protect all par ties con cerned. The commission
should m ake any necessary recommendations to the Supreme Court or Florida for
appropriate act ion.
"This co mmissio n plan, which has also
been approved in principle by The Florida
Bar, is approved in principle by this ConFerence. It should be in addition to, and
not in lieu of, the present impeachment
proced ures.
"The Conrerence approves the present
method or mandatory retirement of judges

1. /111 pell chlllellt is a legislative action generally
brought by the lowe r h ouse and trie d by the upper
h ouse, with co nviction r equiring a two-third s vote.
Imp eac hm en t proceedings are cumbersome, often
politica l, and with no right of appeal.

i

;ll. a sp cc ificd age <lnd tClllpor;lr y as~iglllllCIIl.
of retired judges who are physically and
mentall y able to properly perf'orm jlldicial
dtlties. This Conl'crence urges l.he adoption
01' a uniform system of retirement i>enc:fits
for judges. T h ese benefits should be suff ic ient to allow t he r etired judge to live with
dignity."
California, like most states of tile U ni o n ,
did not have an adequaLe method for the
rellloval or: judicial o fficers . l t did have l.he
Llll-ee major meth ods conta ined in many
state co nstil.lItions, those o f impea c hm enl.,
reca ll and judic ial action. Cenerally speakin g, however, studenLs of g-overnment ha ve
co ncluded that these methods ha ve proved
effect ive only in the few in SLan ces w here a
judge has bee n involved in a major scancLiI
which ha s aroused widespread adverse p,!lhI ic reaction. 1
None o[ these m eth ods prov id e an effective means for a private citizen to seek r elief against the wrongful ac t of a judge.
There is no b oard or age ncy to which he
ca n complain with some expectation that
his complaint will be inv es ti ga ted and
heard. To expect such a person to seek
relief throu g h the urging or impeac hm ent
proceed in gs by his state leg isla t l\l"e, or to
resort to petitio ns for reca ll is n ot realistic.
These are 'methods wh ich are beyond the
reach or the ordinary citizen and particularly in populous states.
In 1960 California amended its constitution at the behest of the Ch ief Jus t ice, Ph il
S. Gibson, the State Judicial COllncil, the
Legislature, the State Bar and State Con-

R ecall re quires th e in"umh ent to su bmit to the vote
of th e elec to ra te as to whether he s)wll be remove d
on petition of a ce rtain p e rce ntage of the voters, and
it is al so esse ntiall y political.

the New J e rsey a nd Puerto Rican Co n stitution s jus·
ti ces of th eir hi gh est co urts are subje ct to removal by
th e imp eachment process ; all other jud ges are subj ect
to removal for cause, or to r etirem en t for in cap aci ty ,
h y the Suprem e Co urt after appropriate h ea rin g. The
Model Judi cia l Article for state co nstitution s developed by th e Sec, ti on of Judi cia ) Admini stration of th e
Am erican Bar Ass ociation, and endorsed by th e lalter
in 1962, contains provision s similar to the con stitutional provisions ju st r eferr ed to.

R emo vlll by jlldicial lIction is a mu ch less expensive, m ore expe di ent and effective m ethod, and in
recent years is meeting with considerable support. In

Lea ding examples of states which employ judi cial
action as a means of removal of judges are New York ,
Illinois, Texas, Louisiana and Alabama.
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[erellcc of .J lldges, alld the amendment provided lor a system quite similar to the one
recen tl y r ecom mended by th e consensus of
the florida conference. he system creates
a special commission charged with the responsibility of r eceivin g, investigat in g and
co nsiderin g complaints co ncerning judges
ol co urts of all levels in the state's jlldicial
system and recom m ending to the Supreme
Court the retirement of any judge for disability or his rem oval from office 1'01' will'lll
misco nduct. \t\1hen it was initially proposed ,
there were a few judges who consc ientiously felt the establishment of such a COIllmission constituted a threat to the independence of the judiciary, and they raised
their voices in opposition to its passage.
Most judges were strongly in favor of the
proposal , as was th e Conference of Judges
which supported it. Now that the plan has
been in operation for approximately four
years, pratica lly all opposition to it has disappeared and it has met with uniform and
widespread support. As Ch ief Justice G i bson of the State Supreme Court stated: "No
honest and industrious judge who has the
mental and physical capacity to perform
his duties has anything to fear from" the
commission method of removal. "Surely the
people have the right to expect that every
judge will be honest and industrious and
that no judge will be permitted to remain
on the bench if he suffers from physical or
mental infirmity which seriously and permanently in terferes with the performance
of his judicial duties."
The commission established by the constitutional amendment is called "The Com~mission on Judicial Qualifications," a misnomer since the commission does not participate in the qualifying of judges but only
in their disqualification-their removal.
The commission consists of nine members:
five j udg'es, two lawyers an two -laymen.
'Fhe--jmiges areappointed by the Supreme
Court, two from the intermediate appellate
courts, two from the trial court of unlimited jurisdiction and one from the trial
court of· limited jurisdiction. No members
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of the SlIpreme Court arc eli g ible [or
appointment to th e commiss ion, since tl e
Supreme Court itself ac ts in a sense as an
appellate body to r eview the act ions of the
commission and since it has t~e final power
to remove or retire a judge upon r ecommendation of the comm ission. The two
lawyers are appointed by the Board of Covernors of the State Bar, which is an integrated bar, and the two la ymen are a ppointed by the govern or. These persons a ll
serve for slaggered terms which provide for
a measure of continuity.
The Duties of the Commission

The duty of the commission is to recoJll mend to the Supreme Co urt [or rem ova l
from his .iudicial office a ny judge in an y
court of the state, including the Sllprem e \
Court, who is found by the commission to ·
be guilty of wilful misco nduct in olTice, of
wilful and persistent failure to perform his
duties, or 01' habitua l intemperance. Lik ewise, the commission may recomm end for
retirement any judge havin g any disability
which seriously interferes with the perform- I
ance of his duties, and which is , or is likel y
to become, of a permanent character. The
commission has the power to subpoena witnesses, make investigations, take evidence
and to make findin gs.
As of the end of 1964 the commiss ion has
been in existence for approximately four
years during which it has received 344 COI11p laints against judges; the commission has
directly caused the resignation or retirement of 26 judges. Indirectly, as a result of
complaints being filed and of commission
action investigating such complaints, it has
induced the resignation or retirement of a
small number of judges who saw the handwriting on the wall. As over this period
there were more than a thousand judges in
California, one can readily perceive th a t
the percentage of judges who are unfit for
one reason or another is exceedingly small.
] ustice A. Frank Bray, presiding Justice
of the District Court of Appeal, First Ap-
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pcllale Di~LI'ict , Divi~ion One, who acted as
cha irm an ot lhe commission during the
first four years ot its existence, in speaking
on the work of th e co mmission stated that
in his judgment lhe Ca lifornia procedure
ll1eet~ four important needs:
.. (I) The Com III issi o n re co lll111end~ lhe
removal or forced reliremellt of jlldges who,
for any reason , arc no longer able to properly perform lheir ollic ial dlltie~ or have
been g uil ty of lllisco nduct.
.. (2) The very ex islence of: the Comlllis~ion wilh the po wers g iven it aCLs as a deterrent to the occa~iona l recalcilrant judge
and minimi/.es absence (rom judicial duties
[or extend ed periods.
.. (3) The Commission provides a
medium throu gh which the disgruntled
litigant, and even the crank, may air his
grievances again~t the courts or judges without publicity affecting the particular judge
singled out. In most instances the complaints are so ground less that we do not
even notify the judg'e charged that a complaint against him has been made. In a
sense, the Commission offers an apparently
sympathetic shoulder upon which these
complainants may cry. While they are never
satisfied with o ur actions, nevertheless, you
would be surprised to find how much more
content they are than they would have been
had there not been a public agency to give
them consideration. In many of these complaints the compla inant is seek ing a retrial
ot the action which he contends was improperly determined aga inst hi m . 'Ve, ot
course, have no appellate jurisdiction.
"(4) In quite a number of instances,
lhese complaints disclose situations, which,
while not serious enough to warrant the
removal of the judge designated, nevertheless disclose practices indicating that the
particular judge has a poor idea or none at
all, of public relations, or the proper relationship between judge and counsel, or
judge and witness, or party; or they may
indicate a lack of knowledge of the Code
of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association and of the Conference of Cali-
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[om ia Jud ges, of such ili a LLers, for exam pI e,
as co ntinu ed failure to slart co urt on time,
takin g unlimi ted r ecesses, cons ta nt wi secracking in court, short court ho urs, etc. In
these in sta nces, we notify the judge of the
ch arge and tacL[ul ly suggest Lh a t if: the pracLi ce complained of exis ts, it be disco nLinu ed .
Thus, the Commission, in cases 01' improper
conduct n o t serio us enO lwh
to war.'udicial
n
J
rant remova l, does have a sort of di sc iplinary power. T his is important in prevenling the judicial image from losing the
respect of the people.
"It should be pointed out that lhere is
no red tape or Formal restricti ons on the
making of a comp l ~lint against a jlldge. Any
person may make such compla int hy letter
or other writing. Of the 344 compla ints in
tour years, only 11 8 required any kind of
investigation. The rest were groundless on
their faces . If there appears to be the
slightest indication of conduct by, or incapacity of, the judge which would justity
the action of the Commission, an investigation is made, and the matter of probable
cause for proceeding further is determined.
The Value of a Commission

" Our experience ot four years ot the
Commission's existence has proved, we
th ink, t.he val ue of this system of removal.
In every instance, save one, where the Commission, after investigation, has felt that a
judge'S actions or condition might require a
recommendation for removal or retirement,
the judge, upon being confronted by the
fact that he would have to appear at a hearing before the Commission, has either retired, if eligible, or has resigned. In only
one instance has a formal hearing been had.
In that instance, the Commission held a
seven day hearing at which a Deputy Attorney General presented the charges, and
the defendant and his attorney resisted
them. Forty-seven exhibits were introduced,
and 48 witnesses heard. The Commission
recommended to the Supreme Court the
removal of the judge.

"
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"The COllllllissioll'S work is enLirel y C011li ck mi;t1 . \Ve ma y 11 0t inform anyone o f Lhe
c h;wges exce pt the jlldge him se lf, unLil the
C011llllissio11 has r ecomm ended rem ova l to
th e SlIpreme COlin. Then, for the first
lim e, th e reco rds arc open to pllblic in:-;penion ."
As I have indicated , when the record of
proceedin gs bdore the co nllllissio ll is filed
wilh th e SlIpreme COllrt Wilh a r eco mm e11da lio11 ror rellloval or reLirell1en t or a
jlldge, l.h e SlIpreme COllrt co nducls ils own
rev iew o( the proceedings and may, if it
d eem s n ecessa ry, permit the introduction
o[ additi onal evidence. At the co nclusio n of
its r ev iew l.he Supreme Court may order
lh e rem ova l or retirement of the judge if
it finds just ca use, or it may wholly r eject
th e recommendation of the commission . It
is interesting to note that in the single
instance referred to by ] ustice Bray, where
the commission at the conclusion of its
formal hearing recommended to the Supreme Court th at a .i udge be r emoved , the
CO llrt as a result of its own review of the
proceedings rejected the recommendation,
evidently disagreeing with the commission
that there were sufficient grounds to warrant the r em oval of the particular judge
('rom office. This result certainly gave evidence that the appellate process whereby
the recommendat ions of the commission
are subject to the review of the Supreme
Co urt on both the law a nd the facts is
wh olly ind ependent, as it should be, and is
similar to the final review accorded litigants
in ordinary court proceedings by the highest court of the state.
r was privileged to serve on the first commission appointed under the constitutional
amendment in California and was very
favorably impressed with th e operation of
the system. r was particularly interested in
the active participation in the affairs of the
com missi on by the two outstanding lay
leaders appointed by the Governor to serve
on the commission. They entered into the
work of the commission with the same
enthusiasm and deep sense of responsibility

Vol . ·18, .V o. V

wh icl l typ ified the a tlil.llde o f the I rofcssiona I members o[ th e CO III III iss ion .
B;lsed on the Californ ia experience, J
would certa in ly stress tl lat any such plan
in clud e within it a provision ('or confid elltiality wi th respect l. all complaints, i 1 <juiri es, invest.i ga tions and hea rin gs up 10
the point of the taki ng of action by a COIllmission recommending to the st;lle's hi gh est co urt the ac tu al remova l or retireme nt
or a judge. T his protects the innocent. judg-e
('rom irreparable damag-c by p ubli cilY resulting fr om the filin g of a compla int which
an investiga ti on proves to be gro Lindl e~s,
and, eq ua lly important, it r emoves fea r o[
repri sal from po tential complainants.
It is essential that of all hum an beings in
our society the judge must remain the m os t
incorruptible b ecause it is he who in the
last an alysi s is the final pro tector of our
rights to lite, liberty and property under
law. This is the image which, in ge n eral,
the public has in this country of its judges,
and so deeply in gra ined is it that wh en in
fact a scandal does involve a judge it becom es a matter of national attention and
con cern. That this im age m ay n ot be unjustifi ably tarnish ed, great care must be
exercised that comp la ints aga inst judges
do n ot receive publicity until and unless
upon .screening by an independ ent and
qualified commission they ar e sh ow n to
have m erit. Even then it is better th at the
ac tion of such a commission result in the
relinq uishment of office by such a judge,
than to have the fine reputation of the
hundreds of able men and women to wh om
judicial office has been entrusted tarnish ed
by the shortcomings of a single judge.
By the establishment of a program fo r
the removal or retirement of th ose judges
who fail to measure up to these high standards, similar to the California plan, whi ch
we are advised is now being studied in
more than a dozen states, the independen ce
of the judiciary is fully protected and at the
same time the public is assured of the continued service of capable, efficient and conscientious judges.

